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Abstract: Since California voters approved Proposition 13 in 1978, fifteen states have enacted caps on the 
annual growth in assessed property values. These laws often impose a great burden on municipal finances 
and create horizontal inequity among homeowners. Why do voters choose to limit local government in this 
way? Reasons may include controlling the power of special interests, addressing agency failures of 
government officials (the “Leviathan” hypothesis), or preserving the impact of a current but fleeting 
antitax political alignment. Yet research has found that voters’ perception of a limitation’s fiscal 
consequences do not match reality, questioning the rationality of voter behavior. To counter this position, 
another strand of literature argues that support for tax limitations is driven not by perceptions of 
government inefficiency but by reasonable expectations of who will ultimately bear the tax limitation’s 
burden. We explore this view by exploiting the differential tax treatment generated by assessment caps in 
the context of a recent, novel referendum in Florida. We examine voter support for a 2008 constitutional 
amendment that included a unique provision making the existing assessment cap portable within the 
state. We test the hypothesis that voters understood the mobility consequences of tax limitations and the 
net burden of the cap. We find that high potential tax savings and high expected mobility rates result in 
higher support for portability. We also find that the degree of racial segregation, the presence of 
nonresidential tax bases, and the share of migrants from out of state all contribute to support for the 
amendment. Results suggest that voters were as concerned with reducing their own tax share at the 
expense of other property owners as they were with curtailing local expenditures. 
 
JEL classification: H3, H2, H7, J1, R4 
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Do Voters Hold the Key: Lock-in, Mobility and the Portability of Property 
Tax Exemptions 
 
Since the property tax revolts began with California voters’ approval of Proposition 13 in 
1978, 15 states have capped the growth in assessed property values (Hoyt et al, 2009).  While 
research has been directed at assessing the impact of these laws on the provision of local public 
goods (including Downes, 1992; Figlio, 1997), considerable effort has also been expended at 
understanding why voters would choose to restrict local governments’ revenue raising ability by 
imposing state tax limitations.  Voters may support limitations because they believe tax cuts will 
improve local government efficiency rather than reduce public services (Citrin, 1979; Ladd and 
Wilson, 1982). Consistent with this belief, Cutler, Elmendorf and Zeckhauer (1999) find that 
voters’ personal tax liabilities color their view of government efficiency. Yet, several studies 
have shown that voters’ perceptions of the consequences of tax limitations do not match the 
reality, questioning the rationality of voter behavior (Figlio and Rueben, 2001; Doyle, 1994). 
However, Fischel (1989) counters that support for Proposition 13 was driven by a (reasonable) 
expectation that revenue would be redirected to other constituencies, while Anderson and Papke 
(2008) suggest that current voter do not trust future voters to guard their interests. Thus, support 
for property tax limitation may not be driven by voters concern that their local government is 
unresponsive, but instead by fears of shifting tax burdens and services between citizens or over 
time. This paper examines this view by exploiting the differential tax treatment generated by 
assessment caps in an analysis of voter support for a fundamental change in an existing tax 
limitation. 2 
 
The connection between property tax limitations and residential mobility is strong. While 
intended to stem rising property taxes, limitations may im pair the property market by inducing 
homeowners to overstay in their current residence. This distortion arises particularly because tax 
limitations usually include a provision for an assessment cap, in which the taxable, assessed 
value of the house does not climb as fast as the market value of the house. Because the cap 
remains in place until the homeowner moves away, inequity arises when the property tax bills of 
two similar houses differ because of the lengths of tenure of the residents. Distorted housing 
consumption can generate deadweight loss as the match quality between a homeowner’s desired 
housing services and those provided by the current unit deteriorates over time (O’Sullivan, 
Sexton, and Sheffrin, 1995a; 1995b).  At the same time, overstaying may reduce the supply of 
the existing housing, slowing household formation and increasing demand for new housing at the 
urban fringe. (Wassmer, 2008) Existing empirical work, primarily focusing on California's 
Proposition 13, has, with the exception of Nagy (1997), found that households subject to an 
assessment cap showed reduced mobility (Bogart, 1990; Stohs, Childs and Stevenson, 2001; 
Wasi and White, 2005; Ferreira, 2007). This finding is consistent with long staying residents 
being “locked-in” to their current home.  
While there is a literature looking at assessment caps’ effect on residential mobility, we 
turn the question around and ask why voters support caps. We test the hypotheses that voters 
understand the mobility consequences of tax limitations and that voters recognize the net burden 
of the tax cap. We take into account three factors: a voter’s relative benefit from the cap, the 
impact it has on local budgets and the ability to shift the household’s tax share onto other 
households. We examine these hypotheses in the context of a recent and novel referendum on 
altering Florida’s existing assessment cap to make it portable within the state.  3 
 
In 1995, Florida voters passed the “Save Our Homes” amendment to the state 
constitution, which capped assessed values for primary residences to the lesser of the rate of 
inflation or three percent, so long as the home remains the owner’s homestead, or primary 
residence. Florida went on to experience a dramatic increase in home values, and long-time 
homeowners enjoyed substantial tax savings from the growing difference between a home’s “just 
value” (market value) and its assessed value.  As of 2008, despite recent declines in house prices, 
a homeowner who purchased her primary residence before 1995 and who experienced the 
average rate of house price appreciation in the state had an assessed value that was 48 percent 
below current market value.
1 Longtime homeowners in south Florida, with its higher price 
appreciation, enjoyed even greater savings. Like in other states with an assessment cap, Save Our 
Homes benefits reset when the homeowner moved. Recently this provision contributed to public 
concern that declining mobility, driven by lock-in considerations, was inflicting further pain on 
the slumping real estate market. Further, declining mobility may harm state revenues that rely, in 
part, on transaction fees associated with home sales. In response, Amendment 1 appeared on the 
January 29, 2008 presidential primary ballot.  In addition to several other provisions, the 
constitutional amendment altered the Save Our Homes legislation by including the novel 
provision that homeowners could “port” up to 500,000 dollars of their current exemption to a 
new Florida residence. This represented the first instance in the United States where portability 
of tax savings was extended throughout a state
2  
                                                            
1 Based on the OFHEO purchase only house price index and an assessed value capped at the lesser of the CPI-U or 3 
percent. 
2 Ferreira (2007) examines an amendment to California’s Proposition 13 that permitted counties to port the 
exemptions of residents 55 and over. Counties had a choice whether to allow the portability or not. 4 
 
The portability provision is unusual because it can impact not only a household’s current 
and future property tax liability and thus the finances of its current town, but also the finances of 
any town the household may move to in the future. Formerly, cities were able to rely on a certain 
amount of turnover in the market to reset assessed prices back to market prices.  In the post 
Amendment 1 environment, municipalities must either raise the tax rate or rely increasingly on 
non-homestead property and new Florida residents to increase the tax base. They must also 
contend with migrants from within Florida bringing their accrued tax exemption with them, 
potentially eroding the tax base further. Rational voters had to balance their potential tax savings, 
their likelihood of moving, the possible impact on local public goods and the response of local 
governments to a smaller tax base when deciding whether to support Amendment 1. In this 
paper, we attempt to identify key determinants of support for the amendment, which ultimately 
passed with 60% of the vote on January 29, 2008.  
We combine precinct level election data from the 2008 vote with 2000 census block 
group data and assessor property records for all but three Florida counties.  Controlling for socio-
economic determinants drawn from the 2000 census, and political ideology inferred from the 
2000 presidential election, we predict the share of the yes vote for Amendment 1 based on the 
expected average mobility rate and the existing tax savings (the “tax wedge”) from Save Our 
Homes. The richness of our data allows us to devise a methodology to separate out the tax 
savings effects of the amendment from the mobility effects. 
  We find that precincts with high rates of expected mobility and large tax wedges between 
assessed and market values had a higher share of voters vote yes. The share yes vote also 
declines with educational attainment, the prevalence of children and the prevalence of elderly, 
and it rises with distance from the CBD and income. 5 
 
Amendment 1, despite being passed at the state level, directly impacts the tax base of 
local governments. A rational voter would require some implicit model of local government 
behavior to determine whether the passage of Amendment 1 would cause her city or town to 
lower local public services or to simply increase the millage rate; and if the rate is raised, 
whether the tax reform would on net lower her tax share at the expense of other residents. In the 
second part of the analysis, we examine whether the election results demonstrate that voters 
exhibited some strategic consideration in how the burden of the Amendment would be 
distributed. 
We control for the composition of the tax base, the source of migrants (from out of state 
or from another county in Florida) and voters’ relative expected mobility. We find evidence that 
more racially heterogeneous towns had a lower yes share, by controlling for racial heterogeneity, 
find that more segregated towns had a higher yes share, which may be consistent with a desire to 
curb public expenditures.  However, we also find evidence that voters were more likely to vote 
yes if their city’s tax base included a lower share of homestead property.  A precinct’s yes share 
increased if the city received a higher share of out of state migrants.  Finally, perhaps 
surprisingly, we find that relative mobility is a strong predictor of the share yes vote and that 
controlling for relative mobility leaves precinct level mobility only modestly significant and 
negative. The results from this section suggest that voters were savvy as to how tax shares would 
likely shift among homestead recipients if the amendment passed. Putting the evidence together, 
we argue that voters are rationally weighing the individual and short-run benefits of the 
portability amendment against the longer-term public finance consequences. 
Section 2 describes the original Save Our Homes exemption, the details of Amendment 1 
and its implication for the financing of local public government.  Section 3 describes the 6 
 
econometric specification. Section 4 describes the dataset and how we construct our independent 
variables of interest. Section 5 presents the results and then incorporates the relative mobility and 
relative tax base measures and discusses the findings.  There is a brief conclusion in Section 6. 
 
II. Institutional Detail 
In 1995, 54 percent of Florida voters approved changing the state's constitution with the 
“Save Our Homes” (SOH) amendment. The provisions of Save Our Homes apply only to a 
homestead, a property that serves as the primary residence of the owner. Homeowners were (1) 
given a standard $25,000 homestead exemption on assessed value and (2) had the yearly increase 
in assessed value capped at the lesser of three percent the rate of inflation (based on the CPI for 
urban consumers).
3 Table 1 shows the annual capped increase in property values for every year 
since SOH’s inception; in most years, the inflation rate (based on the previous year) represents 
the binding cap. For comparison, the annualized appreciation in the OFHEO house price index is 
reported in the second column of the Table and the third provides the resulting “wedge” for a  
property purchased before 1995 that experienced the average state appreciation  rate.  In 
subsequent years, many parts of Florida enjoyed extraordinary house price appreciation. For 
instance, house prices increased by 130 and 108 percent in Miami and Tampa, respectively, 
between 1995 and April 2008 (Case-Shiller repeat sales index).
4   
                                                            
3 In addition to the standard $25,000 homestead exemption, the amendment also provides a $500 exemption for a 
disabled homeowner, a $500 exemption for a widow or widower and a $5,000 exemption for a disabled veteran. 
Beginning in 1997, there is also a senior citizen’s exemption in some jurisdictions. (Section 193.155(1), F.S.) 
4 Note that for long time homesteaders, assessed value will continue to rise even as current property value declines. 
In a time of declining house prices, the assessed value will gradually catch up with current market value. This is 
mandated by the provisions of SOH. 7 
 
 Like Proposition 13 in California and similar measures in other states, the assessed value 
resets to the market price upon sale.
 5  The large difference between market or “just” value and 
assessed value, is called the “tax wedge” (or simply “wedge”) and was believed to lock families 
into their existing homes.
6 This supposed lack of mobility, combined with the popular perception 
that property taxes were still too high, contributed to the desire to alter the SOH provisions once 
more.
7 On January 29, 2008, 64 percent of Floridians voted to approve Amendment 1. This 
constitutional amendment, which goes into effect for 2008 property taxes, has four elements: (1) 
the homestead exemption is doubled to $50,000 for non-school taxes; (2) a $25,000 exemption is 
created for business property; (3) beginning in 2009, an assessment cap of 10 percent is placed 
on all non-homesteaded property, including rental properties, second homes and commercial 
properties; and (4) the homeowner’s tax wedge is made “portable” to new homes within the 
state.  It is this last provision of the amendment that is at the center of our analysis 
The statewide portability of the SOH tax wedge is unique among the states. If one buys a 
new home of greater value, the total value of the wedge from the past home is transferred to the 
new home, up to a maximum portable cap of $500,000. An example may be useful. Say a 
homeowner purchased a home in 1994 for $100,000 and that by 2008 it has a just value (assessor 
determined market value) of $270,000 and an assessed value of $140,000. The wedge between 
                                                            
5 Florida is a relatively latecomer among the states in passing a statewide property tax limitation. Shadbegian (1998) 
points out that by 1992, half the states had passed some limitation measure. However, some of the states passed 
measures that did not limit annual assessment increases, which made it possible for local jurisdictions to override the 
limitation by inflating assessed values, while others directly capped revenue and forcing jurisdictions to reset the 
millage rate. 
6 Lock-in occurred in both directions of mobility: popular press cited large families that had outgrown their starter 
homes and retired empty-nesters who wanted to downsize, but neither group could afford to pay the additional 
property taxes that would come with a new house. 
7 Charlie Crist, who was elected governor of Florida in 2006, had campaigned on a platform of property tax reform. 
Prior to the passage of Amendment 1, the governor and the legislature enacted a rollback of 2007 property taxes to 
2006 levels, reducing tax revenues by $15 billion. 8 
 
market price and assessed price is $130,000. This homeowner moves up to a home with a just 
value of $300,000. Without portability, the assessed value of the new house is $300,000.
8 With 
portability, the assessed value is $170,000 (300K-130K).
9 This assessed value would then rise 
subject to the yearly cap. Should the homeowner instead choose to buy a cheaper house, she 
would get to keep her old tax wedge percentage.  For example, if the new home were worth 
$230,000, the new assessed value would be $110,740 (230K*(130K/270K)).  
Voters potentially confronted a difficult calculation of local public finance and political 
economy in deciding whether or not to support the referendum.
10 If the voter believed that the 
reduced tax base generated by the law would be offset by a higher millage rate, then she had to 
determine if other property owners, landlords/renters, commercial and industrial property owners 
would bear enough of the burden to result in a net reduction in her property taxes.  At the same 
time, among owner-occupiers, a tax-minimizing voter would have to infer the mobility rate of 
other owners in their same local government relative to her own.  A voter who expected to stay 
in her home for a long time relative to other homestead owners in her town may end up paying 
higher taxes after the passage of homestead exemption portability than before. On the other hand, 
the voter may simply believe that local governments will curtail expenditures; in which case she 
has to trade off the expected tax savings against fewer or poorer public goods. Finally, if a 
resident expects other homeowners from Florida to move into her jurisdiction, the increased 
                                                            
8 Local taxes would then be levied on the assessed value less the original exemption of $25,000 available to all 
homesteaders. For clarity, we can ignore this in the example. 
9 Note that these values were not chosen randomly but instead conform to the state average appreciation rate and 
caps from Table 1.   
10 Many county appraisers have found it necessary to post instructions on their websites explaining to homeowners 
how to calculate their portable benefits. An example is found on the Leon County Property Appraiser's website: 
http://www.leonpa.org/Download/Portability.pdf. 9 
 
millage rate or the loss of public services may outweigh the benefit of shrinking her property’s 
tax assessed value and induce her to vote against the amendment.
11  
III. Empirical Framework 
As discussed in section II above, the expected tax savings a voter might expect from 
Amendment 1 hinged on the voter's current and future tax wedge and her propensity to make a 
within state move. To test whether voters incorporated expectations of likely tax savings into 
voting behavior, we estimate a reduced-form linear regression of share of yes votes at the 
election precinct level on current tax wedges, expected mobility and a set of controls.  
The formal specification is: 
i i i i i u M W y + + + Φ ′ = θ α X          ( 1 )  
Where yi is the share of yes votes in the precinct, Xi is the vector of control variables, Wi is the 
average size of the tax wedge between just and assessed value, Mi is a measure of average 
mobility in the precinct and an error term,  i u . Specifically, we test the null hypothesis H0:  0 = α , 
the size of the average wedge did not affect the share voting yes. Our alternative hypothesis is 
that precincts with a larger average wedge between market and assessed values will vote for the 
right to port those tax savings to a new home (Ha:  0 > α ).  Similarly, we test the null hypothesis: 
H0:  0 = θ , the average mobility of a household does not affect the precinct’s share voting yes 
against the alternative— precincts with higher mobility will vote for the right to port those tax 
savings to a new home (Ha:  0 > θ ). This study uses data from a variety of sources and combines 
them into a precinct-level analysis. We describe them in detail in the next section. 
                                                            
11 For instance, the January 17, 2008, op-ed article in the St. Petersburg Times states that "While the major reason to 
oppose Amendment 1 is its lack of fairness, it would trigger further local government spending cuts that likely 




4.1 Election Data 
The unit of analysis is the election precinct, whose boundaries are determined by each of 
the 67 counties in Florida. The smallest county in our sample has 8 precincts, while the largest 
county has 711. The Amendment 1 initiative appeared on the ballot in the January 29, 2008, 
presidential primary election. All voters had the opportunity to vote on the amendment, and 
registered Democrats and Republicans also got to vote for a presidential candidate.
12 We obtain 
from the Florida Department of Elections the complete statement of vote at the precinct level. 
We supplement this with GIS data of the 2008 election precincts from the Department of 
Elections for each county. There was some difficulty in obtaining Union County's and Sumter 
County’s election results, and so we drop these counties from our analysis.  
Our dependent variable, denoted yi, is the number of yes votes divided by the total 
number of votes cast for Amendment 1. Because there were other notable races on the ballot, not 
all voters cast a vote for or against Amendment 1. When the votes were counted, however, it was 
a clear victory for Amendment 1 supporters. Out of 67 counties, 53 had majorities in favor. 
Counties that supported Amendment 1 represented the whole state, but support was especially 
strong in south Florida. Miami-Dade, Palm Beach and Broward counties each voted about 70 
percent in favor. Supporting counties ranged widely from small to large. In contrast, counties 
where a majority of voters opposed Amendment 1 generally were small and rural. Two notable 
                                                            
12 We note that the winner of the Democratic primary could not receive any convention delegates because of a party 
sanction for moving the vote forward. Republican candidates received half their assigned delegates. Also, none of 
the leading Democratic candidates campaigned in Florida. Thus, Democratic turnout may have been depressed. We 
attempt to correct for political differences among precincts in some of our specifications later on. 11 
 
exceptions were Duval County (Jacksonville) and Leon County (Tallahassee), large counties that 
both voted majority no.   
4.2 Property Data from County Assessor Files 
  To develop a measure of the tax savings that can be expected, we obtain property-level 
data from the Florida Department of Revenue’s 2007 tax roll. This is a complete listing of all 
parcels (residential and commercial) and is compiled from county assessors. Before proceeding, 
we make one more sample cut. Santa Rosa County’s tax roll uses variable names that are 
different from the standardized names. Because of the difficulty in reconciling these variables, 
we choose to drop this county as well from the analysis, leaving us with 64 counties and 6,475 
precincts in our sample.
13 
Key to our analysis is the homeowner’s existing Save Our Homes “wedge,” the 
difference between the home’s just value and its assessed value, both of which are reported for 
every parcel. County assessors are required to update a home’s just value yearly, not only to 
account for market appreciation, but also for any additional improvements that may have been 
made on the parcel.
14  The assessed value for a homesteaded property that has not changed hands 
in the previous year cannot climb more than the SOH cap. Therefore, the wedge, W, is simply the 
difference between the just value and the assessed value.  
We calculate W for every parcel in the state. However, as our unit of analysis is the 
precinct, we need to aggregate up from the parcel level. As the tax roll also contains GIS parcel 
boundaries, we can assign each parcel to the appropriate election precinct in the county. Thus, 
                                                            
13 We do not expect that the three counties dropped to distort our results greatly. They are small: Union, Sumter and 
Santa Rosa counties have 2007 estimated populations of 14,991, 72,246 and 147,044, respectively. (US Census 
Bureau) 
14 Assessors use standard appraisal techniques (comparables and replacement cost valuation) to determine the just 
value. In addition, there is a state requirement that a home be physically inspected at least once every five years. 12 
 
we calculate the average W for single-family parcels within each precinct.
15 We denote the 
average wedge in each precinct as Wi. 
 
4.3 Homeowner Mobility 
We posit that in addition to the potential portable tax saving, a household’s likelihood of 
moving also affects its support for Amendment 1. We expect that a household that is likely to 
move would find Amendment 1 more attractive. To quantify this, we begin with two simple 
neighborhood-level measures of mobility. As a robustness check we introduce and calculate 
additional measures of expected mobility rate based on the characteristics of a parcel that affect 
the likelihood of moving.   
  The property level data from the assessors contain the years of the latest and the second 
most recent sale. One way to characterize the likelihood of residents in a precinct to move is 1 
divided by the average number of years between the latest and the second most recent sale. We 
call this measure the “churn” of the neighborhood. This reciprocal of the length of stay of 
previous homeowners in a precinct is a proxy for the expected mobility of a current resident of 
the precinct in 2008, and this is used as an explanatory variable in our voting equation. 
  Another way to characterize the mobility of households is to use the U.S. Census’s 
measure of mobility. The 2000 Census defines a household as mobile if its residence in 1995 was 
not the same as it was in 2000. We obtain the percentage of each census block group that moved 
within the last five years. We average this measure (and all other census derived block group 
                                                            
15 We exclude multifamily residences (but not townhomes) for three reasons: (1) there appears to be a lack of 
uniformity in how assessors report these properties to the state; (2) a high degree of reporting error can arise from 
condo conversions; and (3) some counties appear to aggregate across units to create a single parcel level variable.  
We are also concerned about the high degree of sub-leasing and number investment properties within condo 
buildings.  It is not clear to us whether a condo owner, even one currently (and honestly) claiming a homestead 
exemption on condo unit would behave more like a homeowner or as a potential landlord when voting.   13 
 
values described later) by precinct. As a precinct usually includes more than one block group, 
and block group boundaries are often not coterminous with precinct boundaries, we weight each 
block group by its share of the total number of housing units within the precinct.
16 
 We develop a third, forward looking measure of expected household mobility that builds 
on the neighborhood churn measure by estimating a duration model. We know how long the 
previous owner was in the property and how long the current owner has lived there. We make 
several assumptions. First, we assume that if the current owner of the property receives a 
homestead exemption, then so did the previous. We also exclude any housing spells that ended 
before 1995 or started after 2006.  Ownership spells that ended before 1995 are relative few (the 
current resident must have lived in the home for at least 13 years) and spells that end (or do not 
end) after 2006 may have been affected by homeowners beginning to anticipated Amendment 1 
or because of the recent dislocation of the housing market resulting from the collapse of the 
Florida property insurance market.
17 All spells that were active in 2006 are treated as right-
censored.  We then estimate the duration model controlling for income, race, age, location and 
federal tax treatment of gains, accounting for the change in 1997. Finally, we use the 64 sets of 
parameter estimates to predict survival of current homeowners one, two and three years into the 
future; these are used to create our explanatory variables, one-, two- and three-year expected 
mobility.  A richer discussion of the mobility hazard is presented in the Data Appendix. 
                                                            
16 To elaborate, we create a measure of lot density defined as block group population in 2000 divided by the number 
of single family lots and then multiply this value by the single family parcels retained from our calculation of the 
wedge and mobility. Thus, a block group makes a large contribution to the precinct mean mobility if it shares a lot 
of parcels in common with the precinct and/or it contains a lot of multifamily housing.  If there is no multifamily 
present, then the weight is simply based on the block group’s share of total parcels in the precinct. We believe this 
weighting scheme is superior to one based simply on the coverage ratio of precinct area and block group area; a 
procedure often employed when a finer unit of analysis (parcel) is unavailable. 
17 We thank Geoff Turnbull for pointing out this second concern.  Estimating survival functions with data through 
2007 does not appreciably change our results. 14 
 
4.4 Other Covariates 
We also control for socioeconomic and demographic factors that may influence the 
likelihood of voting for Amendment 1. These mainly consist of block group level characteristics 
from the 2000 Census: percent non-Hispanic white, percent in various age groups, percent 
college-educated, median household income and income squared and the percentage of the 
housing units that is renter-occupied.
18 In the same way as the census mobility rate is defined, 
each housing parcel is assigned the characteristics of the block group that it is located in. Then 
the precinct average of this value is calculated, weighting by share of housing units. We also 
account for the predictions of the standard monocentric city model by using GIS to determine the 
distance to the nearest central business district (CBD) and including a dummy if the precinct is 
located in the central city of the MSA.  
Voter may also be governed by ideology and may have turned out in different numbers 
because of the disparate treatment of Republican and Democratic contests. The Florida Senate 
has available 2000 presidential election data disaggregated to the block group level. We therefore 
assign to each parcel in our tax roll the percentage of votes cast for Al Gore in that block group. 
This is then collapsed up to a precinct level result as above.
19 Finally, there are institutional and 
                                                            
18 We also tried specifications with additional covariates including poverty rate. These do not substantively affect 
the results and are not reported here. 
19 While results of the Gore vs. Bush election are available by election precinct, they are based on 2000 election 
precinct boundaries, which are not necessarily the same as 2008 precincts.  There is some concern as to the extent of 
vote misreporting due to poor ballot design and/or faulty ballot scanning technology as discussed in Bush vs. Gore 
531 U.S. 70 (2000) p. 106-107.  We believe that any under vote should be largely uniform within counties and can 
thus be absorbed by county fixed effects.  Note that the equal protection grounds upon which Bush vs. Gore 531 
U.S. 70 (2000) and Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70 (2000) were largely decided 
highlighted inconsistencies in the hand recount of presidential “under votes” but as the election results as certified 
represents the second running of machine ballots but excludes (per the Supreme Court’s decree) most hand recounts, 
we believe this is not concern for our empirical analysis. 15 
 
cultural differences between Florida counties, and so we include a full set of dummy variables 
for the 64 counties. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the key variables in the analysis.  
 
V. Analysis 
5.1 Simple Mobility Measures  
  Estimation results using simple measures of mobility are reported in Table 3. All 
specifications in this table include a set of county fixed effects, and standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  We begin by looking at the median wedge in each precinct, W. In the 
simplest regression (Column 1) with no other covariates except for county controls, W is 
significant and positive as expected, suggesting that the portability of the wedge is attractive to 
precincts with high potential tax benefits. However, the magnitude of the parameter on W is 
small: increasing the wedge by $ 70,000 (the equivalent of increasing the wedge by one standard 
deviations) raises the yes share vote by .7 percentage points. However, this is the only 
specification in which W positively and significantly raises the yes share.  Once we include 
richer specifications the effect of W is insignificant or negative. As we explore in last section, we 
claim this is due to the expected off-setting behavior by local governments. 
  Column 2 provides the parameter estimates when we include a rich set of additional 
control variables.  The yes vote share in a precinct falls with educational attainment, rises with 
income, rises with the proportion white and rises with distance from the CBD. The signs on all of 
the age groups are negative and significant, (the omitted category is share 25-65) indicating that 
the presence of children and the presence of senior citizens are both associated with lower levels 
of support for Amendment 1. This may reflect a concern that local public services may suffer if 
Amendment 1 impacts local budgets, or they could reflect that households with children or 16 
 
seniors simply are unlikely to move and hence to take advantage of the portability provision.  
After including covariates (Column 2), the estimated coefficient of W is negative and statistically 
significant at 5 percent.  This finding is perhaps not surprising.  Wedge size is closely tied to 
duration of occupancy which may be associated with lower desired mobility. 
  Columns 3 and 4 suggest that mobility plays an important role in determining support for 
Amendment 1. The churn measure (1 divided by the average of the previous residents’ duration 
in the home) is positive and significant, so that precincts with shorter ownership spells are more 
likely to support Amendment 1; this finding is buttressed by the positive sign on the census 
measure of mobility. The magnitude of the churn suggests that a one standard-deviation increase 
in churn increases the yes share by .46  percentage points.  The census measure, despite 
including renters (which we control for) implies a much larger effect.  Increasing the 5-year 
mobility rate by one one-standard deviation increases the share yes vote by 1.5 percentage 
points.  
  Column 5 includes both the wedge and the churn measure; Despite the implicit linkage 
between wedge and mobility, including both variables does not alter either coefficient estimate. 
Finally, not every parcel receives the homestead exemption, usually because it is a second home 
or a vacation residence. Column 6 includes the percentage of the precinct receiving the 
homestead exemption. The sign for this variable is  negative but insignificant, which may seem 
counterintuitive. However, non-homestead property owners are, almost by definition, ineligible 
to vote and thus owners in low-homestead areas may expect the law to shift more of the burden 17 
 
onto non-residents and absentee landlords.
20  We test for such tax-share shifting considerations at 
the end of paper.  
5.2 Expected Mobility Measures 
Table 4 reports regression results from specifications incorporating the hazard-derived 
measures of mobility. Expected mobility seems to play an important role in support for 
Amendment 1. Whether we include a measure of expected mobility 1, 2, or 3 years into the 
future (Columns 2, 3 and 4), the estimated parameter is significant and positive although only at 
the 10 percent level for the 3-year measure.
21 The magnitudes are in line with the census 
mobility measures; increasing the 1-year expected mobility rate by one standard deviation 
increases the yes share by 3.6 percentage points. The impact is greater for two year mobility but 
less for three year.  Results suggest that the higher the expected mobility in a precinct, the more 
likely that precinct is to support Amendment 1. However, the coefficient estimate on average 
wedge size remains insignificant, suggesting that even when we attempt to isolate the impact of 
mobility on tax wedge, the wedge is, in and of itself, not a strong predictor of support for 
Amendment 1.  
  While households with a large tax wedge or high expected mobility should support 
Amendment 1, the households with both high mobility and a large wedge should be especially 
                                                            
20 On the other hand, the marginal buyer in low-homestead areas may be a non-homesteader and a current resident 
seeking to maintain their property value should oppose Amendment 1 for the same reason childless couples support 
school bonds (Hilber and Mayer, 2004).  Or, perhaps the 10 percent nominal cap on assessment increases, though 
less generous than the flat (real) cap offered homesteaders, was still attractive by offering some protection to non-
homesteaders and their proxies. 
21 The standard errors may suffer from a generated-regressor problem as the expected mobility measures were 
generated from hard model-derived estimates run on the parcel level data for each county.  There is no ready 
analytical method for correcting the errors for this type of estimation.  Experiments with bootstrapping the errors for 
two randomly drawn counties did not appear to grow our estimated standard errors, however any attempt to employ 
this strategy would for the entire state would be very computationally intensive.  Instead we treat Table 4 as a 
robustness check of the churn and census mobility measures. 18 
 
willing to support the law.  The specification results presented in Column 5 includes this 
interaction.  While the wedge remains negative and insignificant the (wedge*mobility) 
interaction is  positive and significant at the five percent level. This suggests mobile households 
with a larger tax wedge were more likely to support Amendment 1.
22 
  Finally, we control for underlying political ideology to guard against concerns about the 
irregular Democratic and Republican primaries. Column 6 of Table 3 includes the percentage of 
the precinct that supported Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election. The estimated coefficient is 
negative and highly statistically significant. To the extent that the variable represents a precinct 
that is relatively liberal, this result suggests that voters on the political left are less likely to 
support Amendment 1. In any case, controlling for ideology does not change our parameter 
estimates for wedge or expected mobility. 
 
5.3 Strategic Political-Economic Voting Behavior 
We now expand the specification to examine whether voters considered the likely response of 
taxing authorities to passage of the referendum. Leading up to the vote predicted that 
Amendment 1, many opponents of the measure claimed it would adversely affect the budgets of 
municipal and county governments, particularly those with substantial in-migration from other 
parts of the state. After Amendment 1 passed, a local government suffering an erosion in their 
real property base could pursue three different strategies.  It could cut expenditures, raise the 
millage rate on the new lower tax base, or raise other taxes or fees such as imposing a local 
                                                            
22 Note that it is somewhat remarkable that the interaction term comes in significant.  The principal determinant of a 
precinct’s average wedge, especially controlling for county fixed effects and thus metropolitan house price 
appreciation histories, is duration in the home.  We believe the strong positive parameter estimate is a testament to 
our mobility measure’s ability to exploit the non-linear function of duration on mobility and hence warrant the 
additional step. 19 
 
option sales tax.  Thus, a rational voter should have considered not only their own wedge and 
expected mobility, but the value of public services that might be cut or their tax liability if the 
their town raised millage rates.  For example, a low mobility household in a high mobility city 
might suffer an increase in property taxes if the referendum leads to a higher tax rate.   
This dynamic suggests that households who can pass the burden of Amendment 1 onto 
other taxpayers may be more likely to support the proposition. To address this we explore a 
series of new variables to explain the ability to “foist” the property tax burden onto other 
households. These are described in the regression specifications in Table 5. 
 
5.4 Presence of racial and ethnic heterogeneity 
Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002) find evidence that racial heterogeneity may lower 
a county’s willingness to support public goods because voters are less able to identify with likely 
recipients or because likely beneficiaries find it harder to form political coalitions.  Voters may 
care more about the tax savings and individual benefits of portability if they do not support the 
redistributive effects of local public services that benefit  racial or ethnic groups other than their 
own. We formulate two measures of dissimilarity, both based on the race categories from the 
Census. The first is a measure of racial heterogeneity that is the probability that two randomly 
drawn individuals in a municipality will be of a different race.
23  The second is the coefficient of 
dissimilarity that measures the degree of segregation across a taxing jurisdiction for any given 
level of racial heterogeneity in the population.  A larger value suggests that blacks and Latinos 
are more concentrated within the jurisdiction. We also consider the possibility that voters do not 
                                                            
23 This measure is defined in Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) as 
2 1( ) i
i
group −∑  where groupi is the share of 
the population in the tax district that is non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black and Hispanic, respectively. 20 
 
perceive the overall racial composition of their city or town but instead look only at their 
immediate surroundings so we create an alternative measure: racial heterogeneity at the census 
tract level.
24  Given the concerns about biased standard errors and confident that our results are 
generally robust to alternative measures of precinct level mobility, we revert to the neighborhood 
churn measure of Table 3. 
   Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present the estimates. Even controlling for share non-
Hispanic white at the precinct level, more heterogeneous towns were less likely to support 
Amendment 1.  However, Column 2 suggests that controlling for any given level of racial and 
ethnic heterogeneity, more segregated towns were more likely to support Amendment 1. A one 
standard deviation increase in dissimilarity increased the yes share by 1.3 percentage points.  We 
take the combined findings as mixed evidence that voter expected Amendment 1 to actually 
lower expenditures. For the balance of the paper we will explore whether voters consider 
possible tax-shifting strategies by their municipality.  
 
5.5 Presence of non-homestead and non-residential property 
  The portability rule affected only homesteaded residential properties. Thus, homesteaded 
voters  may have been more willing to support Amendment 1 if they believed that revenue loss 
from their declining assessments would be made up by higher taxes on non-homestead or non-
housing property.
25 Thus, one explanation for the negative parameter estimate on share 
homestead in the previous regressions is that a high homestead rate suggested that there are 
                                                            
24 Again, because these indices are calculated at a geographical level different from the precinct, we weight the 
indices at our unit of analysis. 
25 Dye, McMillen and Merriman (2006), for instance, show that the residential assessment cap in Illinois resulted in 
higher tax bills for commercial property owners and residents ineligible for the cap. See Bradbury (1988) and 
Calabrese et al (2006) for similar evidence from Massachusetts. 21 
 
fewer other properties that can shoulder the tax burden. There is of course a potentially off-
setting consideration.  Current homesteaders are potential sellers to non-homesteaders.  If the 
marginal buyer of homes in a given neighborhood is likely to be a snow-bird (non-homestead 
recipient) the current voter may oppose Amendment 1 for fear of jeopardizing their home values.  
In Column 3 of Table 5, we include the share of the jurisdiction’s tax base that is currently 
receiving a homestead exemption. Our prior is that controlling for a jurisdiction homestead rate 
and thus its capacity to absorb lower assessed values on homestead property, a precinct’s 
homestead value should turn positive.
26 However, the parameter estimate on jurisdiction 
homestead rate, though positive, is not statistically different from zero, and the precinct’s share 
of properties receiving a homestead exemption remains negative and significant.  However, in 
Column 4 we include three new measures of the tax base of the precinct's jurisdiction
27: the share 
of the jurisdictional tax base that is residential, commercial and industrial.
28 The omitted 
category, the share of assessed value that is agricultural or institutional appears to be negatively 
associated with a yes vote.  This is not surprising given the political and statutory barriers to 
taxing this class of land.  Within the remaining categories the (effectively) non-homestead 
residential tax base has the largest association with a yes vote, where as voters in towns with 
large shares of the tax base in commercial, industrial and homesteaded residential properties 
appear to have similar support for Amendment 1: 9.54, 11.38 and 8.41 (15.58-7.17), 
respectively.  There are at least two explanations for this pattern of results.  One is that it may 
simply be more difficult to change tax rates across property classes and so non-homestead 
                                                            
26 Though not shown, Table 5 includes the rental rate from the 2000 census, so we believe the share non-homestead 
is capturing ownership of second homes, a large share of the housing market in Florida. 
27 Here and later in the paper, "jurisdiction" refers to a city or town if the precinct in located in an incorporated area, 
and to the county if it is in an unincorporated area. 
28 These do not add up to 1 because of additional tax base categories such as institutional and agricultural property.  
Agricultural land under Florida’s Greenbelt law is taxed based on current use and is generally difficult to tax.  22 
 
residential land, either rental or snow-bird is the easiest type of property to shift the tax burden 
onto.  Alternatively, residents of town with a large share of commercial and industrial land may 
already enjoy a lower tax rate (which we do not observe) and are thus less concerned with their 
current assessed property value.  Alternatively, owners or residents of a commercial property that 
reside within the same jurisdiction as their business may fear the imposition or increase in the 
Local Option Sales Tax (LOST).  Similarly, owners and workers of industrial property may fear 
an increase in utility fees.   
5.6 Mobility and support for Amendment 1 
  The most remarkable feature of Amendment 1 is the exemption portability.  While one 
might like to port their exemption at some time in the future, so will other current homeowners.  
The ultimate tax burden one experiences may hinge on one’s mobility, but also the mobility of 
fellow town residents. A resident living in a city where there are many migrants coming in from 
within Florida may expect these migrants to put pressure on local expenditures while not 
contributing to the tax base – thus dampening support for tax portability. On the other hand, 
residents living in towns with high rates of migration from out-of-state can rely on these ”wedge-
less” buyers to reset the assessed value and slow the erosion of the tax base. Column 1 of Table 6 
provides the baseline result for this analysis.  We use the 2000 census measure of tax jurisdiction 
(city-level) mobility and precinct level mobility.  This specification also includes all of 
jurisdiction tax-base share measures from Column 4 of Table 5. Here we find results more 
consistent with our expectation regarding the homestead exemption.  While precincts with high 
rates of mobility are more likely to support Amendment 1, controlling for precinct (own) 
mobility, voters in high-mobility jurisdiction appear to be less likely to support Amendment 1 
though the parameter estimate is not statistically different from zero. 23 
 
  In Column 2 of Table 6 we include out-of-state mobility into the cities.  Cities with a 
large share of out-of-state immigrants are significantly more likely to support Amendment 1: a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the share of voters from out-of-state increases support for 
Amendment 1 by 3.2 percentage points. We believe this evidence is consistent with some 
strategic consideration on the part of voters. 
  To examine the impact of in-state migrants, in Column 3 of Table 6 we include in-state 
but out-of-county migration rate. This variable does not appear to be associated with higher 
support for Amendment 1. To explore this result further, we argue that not all in-state migrants 
are equal.  If a voter lives in a county where the average wedge is low, relative to other counties 
in the state, it is likely that migrants from other parts of Florida will port large wedges. This will 
place substantial pressure on local budgets, and the support for Amendment 1 should be lower. 
On the other hand, if the average wedge in the receiving county is high, in-state migrants will not 
port a very large wedge into the county, and migration should have relatively little effect on 
voter support. We include an interaction variable that is the (in-state, out-of-county mobility 
rate)*(county average wedge). Column 4 shows the results, but the parameter estimates on both 
the in-state mobility and on the interaction term are not statistically different from zero. Perhaps 
this occurs because most out-of-county moves are still likely to be within the same metro area 
and thus porting similar sized wedges. However, without knowing the origin of county of the 
migrating households, we cannot conclusively test for this hypothesis.  
As a final examination of the tax shifting considerations in voting behavior, we construct 
a new variable based on the ratio of a precinct’s own mobility relative to other homeowners in 
the same jurisdiction. The hypothesis is that if a precinct is relatively more likely to move than 
other precincts in the same jurisdiction, it is more likely to take advantage of the portability 24 
 
provision. We again employ previous owners’ churn as our proxy for current owners’ mobility, 
but the following results are robust to other measures of mobility.  Column 5 of Table 6 provides 
the parameter estimates for the relative measure.  Note that own precinct’s parameter on churn is 
now negative but relative churn is positive, though neither is statistically different from zero at 5 
percent cut-off.  However, in Column 7 we limit the sample to cities with twenty-five or more 
precincts in order to mitigate the effect of having precinct churn included as both a level and a 
ratio. We find that both the churn and relative churn parameters become strongly significant; 
combined, the marginal effect, calculated at the means is positive. In other words, support for 
Amendment 1 falls if people tend to own their single family homes longer than other property 
owners in town. We take this as evidence that voters understand the fundamental shifting in tax 
burdens that portability would provide: Under the original Save Our Homes provisions, long-
stayers could expect the tax burden to slowly shift to high churn households .  Amendment 1 
reverses that effect and, assuming it leads to an increase in the millage rate or other taxes, causes 
the tax-share of long duration residents to rise. Thus, Amendment 1 acted as a way for high-
mobility households to shift the burden back to the low-mobility ones, and the voting results are 
consistent with this claim.  
 
VI. Conclusion   
 
While many states have introduced property assessment caps in order to limit the taxing 
power of local governments, Florida’s Amendment 1 was the first statewide provision that 
allows the benefits of the assessment caps to be portable within the state. This potentially will 
have significant impact on the mobility of homeowners and the efficient matching of 
homeowners to homes. The differential tax burdens that the amendment generates allow us to 25 
 
test whether voters recognized the fiscal impact of this complicated provision upon themselves 
and upon others. Precinct-level voting data from the referendum were regressed on 
socioeconomic, geographic and political variables. The key explanatory variables were the 
potential tax wedge formed by the difference between the just value and the assessed value of a 
house and various measures of household mobility. These variables were derived from a 
complete statewide tax roll of properties. We found evidence that voters with high expected 
mobility were more likely to support Amendment 1 but the size of the existing wedge was not an 
important determinant. 
In addition we have found evidence that support for Amendment 1 increased with 
income, distance from the CBD where public goods tend to be concentrated, and with racial 
segregation, consistent with certain households’ interest in lowering local public expenditures. 
However, we have also found that Amendment 1 voters may be more concerned with shifting the 
tax burden to non-homestead properties, to out of state migrants or (back) to long staying 
residents. The results suggest that voters strategically anticipated the response of local budgets 
and millage rates to the new portability, and they were able to weigh the short-term tax savings 
benefits against longer-term consequences on the local budget and tax burdens. 26 
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Data Appendix A: Creating a Measure of Expected Mobility 
 
The specification for the hazard of moving function is: 
) exp( ) ( ) ( 0 β X t h t h ′ =  
where the baseline hazard, ) ( 0 t h , is estimated non-parametrically and then shifted proportionally 
by changes in a vector of covariates X. We include in X Census 2000 controls for the block group 
that the property is located in: income and income squared; share of population that is non-
Hispanic white; educational attainment; and share of population in the following age groups: 0-4, 
5-13, 14-17, 18-24, 25-64, and 64 plus. We also include the property’s distance from the CBD as 
a control.
29 Building on the work of Sinai (1997), Newman and Reschovsky (1987) and 
Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008), we also include the following variables to account for lock-
in effects generated by the federal treatment on capital gains in owner occupied housing: 
occupancy spell completed before 1997; capital gain in excess of $125,000; (occupancy spell 
completed before 1997*capital gain in excess of 125,000); occupancy spell completed after 
1997; and (occupancy spell completed after 1997*capital gain in excess of $500,000).  We run 
each model separately by county yielding 64 separate regression estimates. Some summary 
statistics of the parameter estimates for the county regressions are presented in Appendix Table 
A1.  The full set of coefficient estimates is available from the authors upon request.   
                                                            
29 These additional covariates, for the most part, appear in the main voting equation as well, and so they are 
described in greater detail in the “Other Covariates” section of the paper. 30 
 
Using the estimated hazard functions and the coefficient estimates on the covariates, we 
calculate for each house the survival probability that the current owner will remain in the house 
(in other words, we ignore the previous owners’ tenure)  and set capital gains to zero to predict 
survival in the absence of a property tax lock-in effect.  The predicted survival curve is thus: 
) ˆ exp(
0 ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ β X t S t S
′ =  
where the non-parametrically fitted baseline survival curve,  ) ( ˆ
0 t S , is shifted proportionally by 
the exponeniated independent variable multiplied by the parameter estimates  β ˆ X′ .  Next we 
estimate the probability of the current owner remaining in the home n years into the future.  We 
do this by moving n years (we do this for n = 1, 2 or 3 years) down the survival curve and then 
shifting it by the current set of covariates and parameter estimates (excluding capital gains): 
) ˆ exp(
0 ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ β X n t S n t S
′ + = + . 
Finally, we take the difference between the current survival curve and the projected 
future survival curve and annualize the change in probabilities to create a measure of expected 
future mobility with passage of Amendment 1: 
n
n t S t S
t S mobn
) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ
) ( ˆ + −
= Δ = .      
Thus, mobn is determined by both the underlying duration dependence of the data –a 
household, having lived ten years in a home is less likely to move next year than a household 
having lived in a home for just three years – and by characteristics of the census block group in 
which the property resides – high income individuals tend to move more.  Like the other 31 
 
independent variables, the expected mobility term is then averaged at the precinct level. The 
precinct average expected mobility is denoted M
n
i, n = 1, 2, 3. 
Generally, we find that mobility falls with the share of children in the block group, 
increases with income and educational attainment and increases for non-Hispanic whites.  We 
also find some evidence for lock-in effects from the tax treatment of capital gains on owner 
occupied housing.  Homes in census block groups with higher shares of persons over 55 appear 
to enjoy a bump up in mobility before 1997 relative to after 1997, and having a gain of more than 
$125,000 (above the maximum one time exclusion pre-1997) was associated with reduced 
mobility compared to after 1997.  This effect was strongest for homes in block groups with a 
larger share of persons age 55 and over.  Similarly, gains in excess of $500,000 (the maximum 
post-1997 exclusion) lowered mobility after 1997 relative to before 1997.32 
 
Table 1. Yearly Assessed Value Increases Mandated by Save Our Homes 
 




Increase  Under 
SOH 
OFHEO State 
House  Price Index 
Increase   
"Wedge" between just 
and assessed property 




1995 2.7%  2.7%  2.2%  0.0% 
1996 2.5%  2.5%  2.8%  0.0% 
1997 3.3%  3.0%  2.6%  0.0% 
1998 1.7%  1.7%  5.1%  2.7% 
1999 1.6%  1.6%  3.9%  4.8% 
2000 2.7%  2.7%  6.6%  8.3% 
2001 3.4%  3.0%  10.0%  14.1% 
2002 1.6%  1.6%  10.1%  20.8% 
2003 2.4%  2.4%  10.4%  26.5% 
2004 1.9%  1.9%  17.0%  36.0% 
2005 3.3%  3.0%  25.6%  47.5% 
2006 3.4%  3.0%  17.1%  53.8% 
2007 2.5%  2.5%  -0.6%  52.4% 
2008 4.1%  3.0%  -6.0%  47.8% 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Analysis 
 (1)    (2)   








Share of Votes “yes”  0.631    0.623   
Wedge in $100,000s 
(market price – capped price) 
0.639 (0.835)  0.619  (0.676) 
Measures of Mobility:        
Moved in last 5 years 
(2000 census) 
0.499 (0.119)  0.504  (0.123) 
Moved into district from out of state  0.160  (0.052)     
Moved into district from out of county  0.089  (0.053)     
Churn-previous owner’s duration in home  6.19  (2.10)  6.14  (1.98) 
Relative churn – churn/churn in other precincts 
in tax jurisdiction 
1.02 (0.30)  1.02  (0.30) 
1-yr expected mobility 
(expected change in survival) 
0.071 (0.013)  0.071 
 
(0.012) 
2-yr expected mobility 
(annualized) 
0.059 (0.011)  0.059 
 
(0.010) 







Educational Attainment:        
Some college  0.286  (0.065)  0.287  (0.065) 
Bachelor’s deg.  0.145  (0.088)  0.145  (0.088) 
Graduate deg.  0.083  (0.065)  0.0834  (0.067) 
Age Composition:        
Age 0-4  0.056  (0.022)  0.058  (0.021) 
Age 5-14  0.127  (0.047)  0.129  (0.047) 
Age 15-17  0.037  (0.014)  0.038  (0.015) 
Age 18-24  0.076  (0.052)  0.079  (0.058) 
Age 65 and above  0.189  (0.142)  0.180  (0.142) 
Other Controls:        
Median income (log)  44.0  (19.3)  43.9  (18.7) 
Non-Hispanic white (percent)  69.5  (27.4)  66.3  (28.7) 
Share receiving homestead exemption  0.558  (0.221)  0.219  (0.219) 
Share voting for Gore in 2000 general election  0.507  (0.169)  0.524  (0.176) 
Racial concentration-tax district  0.40  (0.17)  0.44  (0.15) 
Racial dissimilarity  49.62  (48.64)  51.53  (43.49) 
Dummy - central city  0.20  0.38  0.44  (0.15) 
Distance – CBD  12.9  (11.8)  11.4  (8.9) 
Observations  6371   3968   34 
 
Table 3 Determinants of Vote Share for Amendment 1 – Wedge and Simple Mobility Measures 
Dependent Variable = [Yes votes/(Yes + No)]*100 
 











+ Share with 
homestead 
exemption 
Wedge  0.009**  -0.004*     -0.005* -0.003 
(just – assessed value)  (0.002)  (0.002)     (0.002) (0.002) 
Churn     0.777**   0.766**  0.749** 
     (0.098)   (0.096)  (0.094) 
Census  mobility  rate       13.314**    
       (1.349)    
% with homestead 
exemption 
       -1.552 
         (1.041) 
Some  college    -3.924+ -4.081*  -6.883**  -3.786+ -3.088 
    (2.074) (2.072)  (2.041) (2.073) (2.112) 
Bachelor's  deg.    0.248 0.345  -3.855  0.693 1.000 
    (3.158) (3.182)  (3.176) (3.168) (3.150) 
Graduate deg.    -22.552**  -24.173**  -23.971** -22.970** -23.232** 
    (4.116) (4.120)  (3.898) (4.163) (4.159) 
Age  0-4    -14.514  -13.892 -40.270** -14.015  -12.830 
    (9.843) (9.791)  (10.108)  (9.796) (9.934) 
Age  5-14    -36.461** -36.211**  -29.519** -35.628** -35.446** 
    (6.524) (6.428)  (6.498) (6.413) (6.409) 
Age  15-17    -69.742** -63.360**  -32.597*  -62.005** -59.036** 
    (15.809) (15.598)  (15.905) (15.602) (15.746) 
Age  18-24    -12.044** -11.161**  -15.232** -10.906** -10.804** 
    (3.150) (3.122)  (3.112) (3.118) (3.106) 
Age 65 and above    -12.730**  -10.574**  -9.957**  -10.454**  -10.121** 
    (1.845) (1.816)  (1.836) (1.809) (1.823) 
Median  income    0.195** 0.191**  0.183** 0.192** 0.196** 
    (0.035) (0.036)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Median income
2    -0.0005** -0.0005**  -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** 
    (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Non-Hispanic  white    0.020** 0.020**  0.023** 0.021** 0.021** 
    (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
%  Renters  -0.008  -0.007  -0.039**  -0.009  -0.012 
    (0.010) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Distance  to  CBD   0.059** 0.059**  0.056** 0.057** 0.057** 
    (0.017) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Constant 48.287**  58.088**  57.555**  53.152** 57.012** 57.396** 
  (1.443)  (2.169) (2.128)  (2.222) (2.126) (2.120) 
Observations  6473  6471 6428  6471 6428 6428 
R-squared 0.604  0.651  0.654  0.658 0.655 0.655 
 
All specifications include county fixed effects. For scaling purposes, Wedge is measured in $1,000s. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. +Significant at 10% level; *Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level.  
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Table 4 Robustness Check / Alternative Measures of Mobility and Controls for Political Ideology 
Dependent Variable = [Yes votes/(Yes + No)]*100 
 
 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
 Wedge  Expected   
Mobility 




    1-year 2-year  3-year    
Wedge -0.003  0.000  0.001 0.000  -0.004  -0.003 
(just – assessed value)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) 
1-yr expected mobility    25.915**      24.352**  24.620** 
   (5.363)      (5.304)  (5.237) 
2-yr expected mobility      45.290**       
     (8.891)      
3-yr expected mobility        12.280+     
       (6.990)    
Wedge*1-yr  mobility        0.038*  0.032* 
        (0.016)  (0.015) 
Vote for Al Gore in 
2000 
        -15.239** 
          (0.814) 
% with homestead 
exemption 
-0.931 -2.440* -3.285** -4.628**  -2.324*  -3.478** 
  (0.992)  (0.981) (1.078)  (0.882) (0.986)  (0.988) 
Some college  -3.529+  -3.585+  -3.103 -3.402+  -3.534+  1.298 
  (2.103)  (2.036) (2.051)  (1.930) (2.030)  (2.020) 
Bachelor's  deg.  0.426  0.282 1.876  1.027 0.077  3.286 
  (3.138)  (2.814) (3.055)  (2.776) (2.808)  (2.680) 
Graduate deg.  -22.760**  -24.740**  -24.445** -25.452**  -24.970** -16.832** 
  (4.119)  (4.177) (4.146)  (4.100) (4.185)  (3.984) 
Age  0-4  -13.905  -11.332  -14.018 -5.702 -10.909 -8.155 
  (9.941)  (9.095) (9.446)  (9.392) (9.090)  (8.874) 
Age  5-14  -36.460**  -35.263** -32.986**  -34.367** -34.332**  -21.951** 
  (6.526)  (6.299) (6.288)  (6.194) (6.317)  (6.203) 
Age  15-17  -67.980**  -57.460** -62.390**  -58.602** -56.046**  -44.371** 
  (15.913)  (15.688) (15.495)  (14.706) (15.686)  (15.302) 
Age  18-24  -12.039**  -10.529** -11.415**  -10.147** -9.842**  -6.563* 
  (3.144)  (3.145) (3.040)  (3.096) (3.148)  (2.968) 
Age 65 and above  -12.627**  -8.953**  -8.741** -8.010**  -8.678** -3.548* 
  (1.859)  (1.830) (1.802)  (1.812) (1.831)  (1.764) 
Median income  0.198**  0.228** 0.208**  0.247** 0.233**  0.096** 
  (0.037)  (0.030) (0.035)  (0.029) (0.029)  (0.030) 
Median income
2  -0.0005**  -0.001** -0.001**  -0.001** -0.001**  -0.000 
  (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Non-Hispanic white  0.019*  0.021** 0.021**  0.023** 0.021**  -0.028** 
  (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) 
%  Renters  -0.010  -0.008 -0.013  -0.013 -0.009  -0.027** 
  (0.010)  (0.009) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) 
Distance to CBD  0.059**  0.071** 0.061**  0.067** 0.072**  0.070** 
  (0.017)  (0.015) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015) 
Constant 58.360**  51.870**  50.327** 55.353**  51.721** 62.282** 
  (2.157)  (2.420) (2.518)  (2.389) (2.416)  (2.403) 
Observations  6471  6338 6307  6274 6338  6338 
R-squared 0.651  0.685  0.679 0.696  0.685 0.703 
 
All specifications include county fixed effects. For scaling purposes, Wedge is measured in $1,000s. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. +Significant at 10% level; *Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level.  36 
 
Table 5: Curbing Expenditure vs. Shifting the Tax Burden? 
Dependent Variable = [Yes votes/(Yes + No)]*100 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Tax  district 
racial 
heterogeneity 
Tax district racial 
dissimilarity 
Share of tax base 
covered by homestead 
exemption 
Share of tax base 
by property class 
Wedge -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
(just – assessed value)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Churn 0.700**  0.665**  0.663**  0.682** 
 (0.099)  (0.103)  (0.102)  (0.104) 
% with homestead exemption  -2.805**  -2.670**  -2.808**  -2.267* 
 (1.021)  (1.021)  (1.017)  (1.058) 
Vote for Al Gore in 2000  -14.008**  -13.621**  -13.643**  -14.172** 
 (0.979)  (0.975)  (0.971)  (0.950) 
Racial Heterogeneity  -8.918**  -10.192**  -9.999**  -8.772** 
(tax jurisdiction)  (0.939)  (0.943)  (0.911)  (0.907) 
Racial Dissimilarity    0.031**  0.031**  0.025** 
(tax jurisdiction)    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
        
Share of tax base
1 covered by:         
•  Homestead 
exemption 
   1.086  -7.174** 
     (1.280)  (1.662) 
•  Residential (inclusive of 
homesteads) 
     15.577** 
       (1.944) 
•  Commercial       9.540** 
       (2.889) 
•  Industrial       11.375** 
       (3.945) 
Constant 72.023**  71.530**  71.214**  63.965** 
 (2.128)  (2.140)  (2.166)  (2.495) 
Observations 6393  6393  6393 6393 
R-squared 0.684  0.691  0.691  0.697 
1Excluded category is agricultural, which is assessed based on current use. 
 
All specifications include county fixed effects and all demographic controls. For scaling purposes, Wedge is measured in 




Table 6: Types of Migrants, Portable Wedges and Relative Mobility 
Dependent Variable = [Yes votes/(Yes + No)]*100 
 


















Wedge 0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.000  0.000 
(just – assessed 
value) 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) 
Mobility 10.150**  10.148**  10.179**  11.703**    
 (1.379)  (1.380)  (1.384)  (1.495)     
Jurisdiction-wide 
mobility 
-2.395 -24.279**  -25.724**  -27.081**    




 38.851**  39.778**  39.615**    
   (3.918)  (3.996)  (3.963)     
Jurisdiction-wide 
mobility from 
another Fla. county 
   2.784  9.168    





wedge in county) 
     0.001    
       (0.095)     
Churn         -0.094  -0.540** 
         (0.523)  (0.187) 
Relative churn          0.126  0.187** 
(own precinct churn 
/ jurisdiction 
average churn) 
       (0.081)  (0.029) 
•  Marginal effect          0.588 
            
Constant 62.128**  68.423**  68.495** 67.727**  63.036**  55.943** 
 (2.660)  (2.623)  (2.627)  (2.936) (2.506)  (3.029) 
Observations 6435  6435 6435  6435  6303  3918 
R-squared 0.698  0.704  0.704  0.705  0.703  0.700 
1 The full sample is the set of all precincts in the 64 counties. The restricted sample is the set of the precincts located in 
jurisdictions that have 25 or more precincts. 
 
“Mobility” is the census-derived 5-year mobility rate. All specifications include county fixed effects, all demographic 
controls, controls for racial concentration, segregation and share of tax base classified as homestead, residential, 
commercial and industrial, consistent with the specification presented in Column 4 of Table 5. For scaling purposes, 
Wedge is measured in $1,000s. Robust standard errors in parentheses. +Significant at 10% level; *Significant at 5% level; 

















3        
  some college  0.071 24 26  16 
  Bachelors  0.462 28 30  8 
  Graduate Degree  -0.074 22 34  10 
    
Age distribution 
Share of pop 5-14 yrs old  -0.008 13 30  23 
Share of pop 15-17 yrs old  -1.797 9 27  30 
Share of pop 18-24 yrs old  0.668 14 32  20 
Share of pop 65+ yrs old  -0.002 12 31  23 
        
Income (000s)  0.013 19 33  14 
Income^2 -0.0002 14 33  19 
        
Share non-Hispanic  0.0001 17 35  14 
        
Distance to CBD  -0.001 15 29  22 
    
Capital gains (000s)
4 -0.002 5 24  37 
    
Federal Capital Gains Parameters       
Dummy spell completed pre-97  -1.318 0 3  63 
Share population over age 55  -0.0002 17 17  32 
Share population over age 55*Pre-97  0.0003 35 17  14 
    
Dummy: gain>125K  0.034 29 18  19 
Dummy: gain>125K*pre-97  -0.642 0 6  60 
capgainovr125k_pre97age55 0.0001 22 23  21 
        
Dummy: gain>500K  0.019 18 27  21 
Dummy: gain>125K*post-97  -0.201 3 20  43 
1Residence spell is defined as the time, in years, between the purchase and sale of the home by the previous owner 
or purchase year and 2008 for the current owner. 
2Significance based on a 5-percent cut-off using a two tailed test. 
3All variables relating to age, education and income are drawn from 2000 census block group summary statistics. 
4Capital gain is either the realized gain: sales price less purchase price or for right censored spells the difference 
between purchase price and assessor determined “just value”.  
 